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NO. 6 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
German Arms Exports and the Militari-
sation of Arab States’ Foreign Policies 
Yannik Hüllinghorst and Stephan Roll 
Measured in terms of licenses issued, Arab states will again be among the main recipi-
ents of German military equipment exports in 2020. This continues a trend that has 
been evident since the early 2000s and especially since 2010, all despite Germany’s 
recently extended ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. From 2018 to 2020, the value 
of export licences for the five most important Arab buyer countries has decreased 
compared to the previous period. However, their share of total export licences is still 
over 25 percent. In view of regional developments, this is problematic. The foreign 
policies of the biggest customers have changed in recent years as they become less 
predictable and more willing to use military means to assert their interests. Military 
equipment exports could thus contribute to further escalation of the numerous inter-
state conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, thereby posing great risks to Ger-
many and the EU. Against the backdrop of Germany and the EU’s own export guide-
lines, it is therefore advised to halt exports of military products to these countries. 
 
On December 10, the German government 
announced that it would extend the arms 
export ban imposed on Saudi Arabia in 
2018 by one year. Nevertheless, in 2020, 
Arab states are again among the main re-
cipients of German military equipment 
deliveries. Most recently, Germany author-
ised the export of antiaircraft cannon tanks 
to Qatar and patrol boats to Egypt. This 
continues a trend that began at the start of 
the millennium and has intensified since 
2010 (see diagram, p. 2). Between 2018 and 
2020, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pur-
chased around 4.7 billion euros worth of 
German military equipment, about one 
quarter of the total sold. Among “Third 
countries”, which are neither NATO mem-
bers nor NATO member equivalents, the 
share of these five countries accounts for 
as much as 52 percent of all German sales 
of military products. Only export licences 
for small arms have decreased during the 
last six years significantly. At the same 
time, German-made goods account for only 
a fraction of all the arms purchased by these 
countries. According to the Stockholm In-
ternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
the Middle East is one of the world’s largest 
importers of weapons. Saudi Arabia alone 
accounted for 12 percent of all global arms 
imports between 2015 and 2019. 
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Changes to the Foreign and 
Regional Policies of Arab States 
These Arab states’ rearmament goes hand 
in hand with changes to their foreign poli-
cies. While the Gulf monarchies and Egypt, 
as dependent allies of the US, closely co-
ordinated foreign policy decisions with 
Washington up until 2010, they began to 
break from this course in the wake of the 
so-called “Arab Spring”. Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE established themselves as “leaders 
of the counter-revolution”, for example, 
by suppressing the protest movement in 
Bahrain, supporting the military coup in 
Egypt and fighting the rise of parties and 
groups close to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which were, in turn, offensively supported 
by Qatar. Throughout this period, neither 
side coordinated their respective actions 
with Washington. In Saudi Arabia’s case, 
the West’s rapprochement with Iran in 
the context of the 2015 nuclear agreement 
reinforced this development. Egypt, too, 
loosened its ties with the US, with which it 
had maintained a close military partnership 
since the 1980s. Particularly since the 2013 
coup, Egypt has focused on diversifying its 
foreign relations and shaping its alliance 
policy more independently. In regional con-
flicts, Cairo seeks less to close ranks with 
the US or the EU and instead stands firmly 
by the side of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 
Such increasingly proactive foreign poli-
cies are accompanied by militarisation, 
which is expressed not least in the fact that 
these countries’ military means are being 
used to assert interests more regularly than 
before. The UAE and Qatar have been sup-
porting militias in Libya since 2011, and 
since the beginning of the second Libyan 
civil war in 2014, the UAE has been directly 
involved in military activities there. Egypt, 
in turn, has also been involved in this con-
flict since 2015 at the latest, by granting 
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(LNA) as well as by launching isolated 
airstrikes. In the early years of the Syrian 
civil war, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
supported various rebel groups there, con-
tributing significantly to the escalation 
of military conflict and the radicalisation 
of the insurgency. Saudi Arabia also inter-
vened in the Yemeni civil war in 2015, 
heading a military coalition of friendly 
states, including the UAE. Initially receiving 
hesitant support from some Western gov-
ernments, Saudi Arabia has since become 
increasingly isolated internationally in the 
fight against the Iranian-backed Houthi 
movement, as it is responsible for a high 
number of casualties among the Yemeni 
civilian population. In 2017, a military con-
frontation almost broke out between Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE on the one side and 
Qatar on the other. Until the beginning of 
this year they were locked in a type of cold 
war, which their recent rapprochement is 
unlikely to have completely resolved, im-
plying that the arms race between the two 
sides is expected to continue. 
Regional foreign policies threaten to 
become even more militarised in the 
future. In view of the unresolved conflict 
between Egypt and Ethiopia over water 
from the Nile, there is speculation that 
Cairo could increase its military involve-
ment within its southern neighbourhood. 
In order to exert influence in the Horn of 
Africa, Egypt could try to establish a mili-
tary base in the region, similar to the UAE, 
which already maintains bases in Eritrea 
and the autonomous region of Somaliland. 
In recent years, Algeria has pursued a policy 
of strict non-intervention, but in early 
November 2020 it amended its constitution 
to allow its military to be deployed exter-
nally for – broadly defined – multinational 
peacekeeping missions. According to some 
analysts, this could be a first step by Algiers 
to intervene in the Libyan civil war. At the 
same time, Algeria’s tensions with neigh-
bouring Morocco could increase, especially 
after the US recognised Rabat’s sovereignty 
over Western Sahara. 
Regional Tensions and 
German Licensing Procedures 
Although German politicians criticise the 
fact that Arab states are increasingly inter-
vening militarily or supporting armed mili-
tias, this is not reflected in Berlin’s arms 
export practices. On the contrary: despite 
the concerned states’ increasing willingness 
to apply military force – even in violation 
of international law – German authorisa-
tions of military equipment exports thereto 
have remained high since 2011. 
Considering the German government’s 
conventions surrounding such exports, this 
development is remarkable. Here, guide-
lines for military equipment exports name 
“regional tensions” as a decisive criterion 
for exclusion. The same applies to the Com-
mon Position of the European Council on 
arms exports adopted in 2008, which ex-
plicitly states that “Member States are deter-
mined to prevent the export of military 
technology and equipment which might 
be used for [...] international aggression or 
contribute to regional instability” (Pream-
ble, para. 4). At least in regard to weapons 
of war, German regulations, which were 
rewritten in June 2019, are even stricter. 
Accordingly, arms export licenses should 
be denied to countries “involved in armed 
conflict or where such conflict is imminent, 
where there is a threat of an outbreak of 
armed conflict, or where existing tensions 
and conflicts would be triggered, main-
tained or exacerbated by the export [...], 
unless a case under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter applies” (Political Principles of the 
Federal Government for the Export of War 
Weapons and Other Military Equipment, 
Section III, para. 7). 
With this in mind, even the potential 
of escalating conflict should be sufficient 
reason enough to halt German exports of 
military equipment. However, these pro-
visions seem to play only a minor role, if 
any, when it comes to licensing procedures 
for exports of military products destined for 
the aforementioned Arab countries. Thus, 
regional factors are not the reason for the 
significantly more restrictive approach to 
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licensing practices of small arms exports. 
Rather, such exports have generally been 
severely restricted in recent years. Accord-
ing to the Principles on Small Arms issued 
in 2015, the main reason for this was that 
their proliferation is difficult to control. 
Moreover, even temporary halts on arms 
exports have been justified not due to con-
cerns about regional instability, but due 
to poor human rights records in importing 
countries. This was the case in 2013 with 
Egypt, when civilian massacres occurred in 
the wake of the military coup, and in 2018 
with Saudi Arabia, after dissident Jamal 
Khashoggi was murdered by a state hit-
squad. The fact that patrol boats originally 
intended for Saudi Arabia are now being 
delivered to Egypt, a country with a simi-
larly problematic human rights record, also 
demonstrates a certain inconsistency in the 
application of Germany’s export principles. 
Implications for German 
Export Policy 
In view of regional developments, the Ger-
man government should fundamentally 
review its military equipment export policy 
toward Arab states. So far, it has only given 
vague indications of its political calcula-
tions in individual cases, for example in 
connection with exports to the Gulf States, 
which were occasionally justified by the 
threat posed by Iran. Corresponding argu-
ments on the topic of arms exports have 
also come from the academic community 
in the past. According to some, the targeted 
armament of individual states is intended 
to create a deterrent effect that could ulti-
mately contribute to greater regional sta-
bility. Another argument is that arms 
exports can be used to strengthen bilateral 
relations with the importing country, thus 
opening the door to greater foreign policy 
influence. However, neither of these argu-
ments have been sufficiently empirically 
substantiated and are therefore regarded as 
highly controversial today. Such assess-
ments also largely ignore the fact that indi-
vidual recipients of German exports are 
enemies of one another – as became clear 
in the case of the Qatar blockade – or that 
military equipment is not only used defen-
sively but also offensively in extraterritorial 
regional conflicts. 
It cannot be ruled out that German 
weapons and military products fuel armed 
conflicts in the region and thus contribute 
to the destabilisation of Europe’s immedi-
ate neighbourhood. The probability of this 
occurring is even higher in view of the for-
eign policy changes among the main im-
porting countries described above. Apart 
from the fact that exports of military equip-
ment to countries involved in armed con-
flicts are hardly compatible with Germany’s 
own export principles, it is in Germany’s 
fundamental interest to prevent such a de-
velopment. After all, the deaths of numer-
ous civilians in the Middle East and renewed 
displacement of refugees to Europe would 
not be the least of the consequences. The 
extension of the export ban on Saudi Ara-
bia should therefore be taken as an oppor-
tunity to fundamentally rethink the licens-
ing policy toward the other Arab states at 
hand. Halting the export of military equip-
ment and especially weapons of war to 
these countries seems to be the logical con-
sequence in view of regional developments. 
Yannik Hüllinghorst was an Intern in the Middle East and Africa Research Division at SWP. 
Dr Stephan Roll is Head of the Middle East and Africa Research Division at SWP. 
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